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 Each year, on average, over 100,000 Americans are shot in murders, assaults, 
suicides or suicide attempts, or by police intervention.1 As a result, gun control 
remains a hot-button issue, pitting gun-rights activists against proponents of stricter 
measures of gun control. This issue is not a new phenomenon; throughout the 
twentieth century, states across the country enacted several gun control measures in 
an effort to curb the effects of gun violence,2 as did the federal government.3 The 
Supreme Court weighed in on firearms regulations on several occasions during this 
period,4 but it was not until the landmark decision of District of Columbia v. Heller in 
2008 that the Court recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right rather than a collective5 right to keep and bear firearms.6 The laws at issue in 
that case were District of Columbia (D.C.) gun regulations that effectively banned 
1. 5 Year Average Stat Sheet of Gun Death and Injury, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/f iles/Gun-Death-Injury-Stat-Sheet-5-Year-Average-
2013-Updates-Jan-2015.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
2. In 1911, New York enacted the Sullivan Act, which made it a misdemeanor to possess a firearm without 
a permit and a felony to carry a firearm without a permit. Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A 
Historical Overview, 28 Crime & Just. 137, 168 (2001). In 1923, Arkansas passed a law requiring the 
registration of all handguns. Id. at 169. In 1966, New Jersey enacted a statutory scheme requiring, inter 
alia, a permit issued by the police in order to purchase a firearm, and an additional permit to carry a 
firearm in public. David T. Hardy, Legal Restriction of Firearm Ownership as an Answer to Violent Crime: 
What was the Question?, 6 Hamline L. Rev. 391, 395 (1983).
3. The National Firearms Act of 1934 required “all persons . . . engaged in the business of selling certain 
types of firearms and all owners of these firearms to register with the collector of internal revenue and 
pay applicable taxes for the firearm transfer.” James A. Beckman, National Firearms Act of 1934, in 2 
Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture, and the Law 
427, 427 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2002). The Gun Control Act of 1968 restricted the sales of guns and 
ammunition across state lines and the import of firearms. David B. Kopel, Gun Control Act of 1968, in 1 
Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture, and the Law 
237, 237 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2002). It also created a “prohibited persons” list of classes of people 
prohibited from purchasing certain types of guns, as well as a point-of-sale system of gun owner 
registration. Id. Congress then passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in 1993. Pub. L. 
No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This law created 
a mandatory five-day waiting period between the selection of a firearm and the completion of the sale 
so that gun purchasers could undergo a background check. Id. § 102(a)(1).
4. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not 
force states to enforce federal law requiring mandatory background checks for prospective gun 
purchasers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
178 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to keep and bear a shotgun 
with a barrel of less than eighteen inches).
5. The collective right interpretation of the Second Amendment provides that the amendment protects 
only the right to bear arms as a member of a militia organized by Congress. Carl T. Bogus, What Does 
the Second Amendment Restrict? A Collective Rights Analysis, 18 Const. Comment. 485, 485 (2001). The 
Supreme Court articulated this interpretation when it first addressed the scope of the right to bear arms 
in United States v. Miller, limiting the right to keep and bear arms to types of weapons used in a militia. 
See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; see also David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The 
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551, 557 (1991).
6. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
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the use or possession of operable handguns within the homes of D.C. residents.7 In 
Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment provides a right to use and 
possess firearms for self-defense within the home.8 Following the decision, gun-
rights advocates quickly turned their attention to state and local laws that (1) 
prohibited the carrying of firearms in public or (2) required state-or-municipality 
issued licenses in order to carry firearms in public.9 In Palmer v. District of Columbia, 
the plaintiffs set their sights on two D.C. firearms regulations that required everyone 
in the District to obtain a license in order to own and carry a firearm10 and prohibited 
the open and concealed carry of handguns in the District.11 The power to issue these 
licenses was vested in the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department (“Police 
Chief ”), who could issue licenses so long as the applicants demonstrated a legitimate 
need for carrying a concealed handgun.12 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Heller, the D.C. Council stripped the Police Chief of this power, thereby terminating 
the issuance of these licenses.13
 In Palmer, the plaintiffs, wishing to obtain these licenses, and a prominent gun 
rights organization,14 filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, alleging that the D.C. firearm statutes that required licenses to possess 
firearms and forbade the carrying of firearms infringed on their Second Amendment 
7. Id. at 573–75.
8. Id. at 628–29. Less than three years later, that decision was applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
9. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 2013) (challenging a New Jersey law that required 
permits to carry handguns in public); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(challenging a Maryland law that required permits to carry handguns in public); Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (challenging New York’s licensing scheme for full-carry 
handgun permits).
10. D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2012), invalidated by Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 
(D.D.C. 2014), amended by License to Carry a Pistol Amendment Act of 2014, § 2(b), 62 D.C. Reg. 
1944 (June 16, 2015).
11. D.C. Code § 22-4504(a), invalidated by Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C), amended by License to 
Carry a Pistol Amendment Act § 3(a); Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
12. D.C. Code § 22-4506, repealed by Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008, § 2(f), 56 D.C. Reg. 
1162 (May 20, 2009), revived and amended by License to Carry a Pistol Amendment Act § 3(b); Palmer, 
59 F. Supp. 3d at 176.
13. Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 176.
14. The Second Amendment Foundation (SAF) was a plaintiff to the lawsuit against D.C. Id. at 177. The 
SAF was founded in 1974 by Alan Merril Gottlieb. Marcia L. Godwin, Second Amendment Foundation 
(SAF), in 2 Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture, and 
the Law, supra note 3, at 527, 527. The SAF is comprised of approximately 550,000 members, has an 
annual operating budget of $3.4 million dollars, and is staffed by sixteen people. Id. at 528. The SAF 
states that its mission is to promote “a better understanding about our Constitutional heritage to 
privately own and possess firearms.” Mission Statement, Second Amend. Found., https://www.saf.org/
mission/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). The SAF is a tax exempt organization that does not engage in 
lobbying efforts, and works primarily in the areas of legal and educational research on the meaning of 
the Second Amendment. Earl R. Kruschke, Gun Control: A Reference Handbook 215 (1995).
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rights.15 On July 24, 2014, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.16 In 
granting summary judgment, the court held that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to carry firearms outside the home for purposes of self-defense and that the 
statutes forbidding the carrying of handguns outside the home infringed on that right.17 
This case comment contends that the court in Palmer misinterpreted the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Heller, that the court relied on faulty reasoning from the Seventh 
Circuit case of Moore v. Madigan, and that the court should have conducted a scrutiny 
analysis to determine the constitutionality of the challenged statutes.
 In 1932, amidst a nationwide concern over gun violence,18 Congress enacted 
D.C. Code section 22-4504,19 which prohibited any person from carrying a concealed 
firearm or dangerous weapon in Washington, D.C.20 While citizens of Washington 
had already been prohibited from carrying concealed weapons since 1892, the new 
law imposed additional penalties for crimes committed with a firearm.21 The law was 
then amended in 1943 to ban the open carry of firearms.22
 In 1975, the D.C. Council enacted the Firearms Control Regulations Act.23 The 
law’s purpose was “[t]o protect the citizens of the District from loss of property, death, 
and injury, by controlling the availability of firearms in the community.”24 The law 
15. Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 175.
16. Id. at 184.
17. Id. at 182–83.
18. See Joseph Michael Newhard, ‘Bootleggers’ and Gun Control, Regulation, Fall 2015, at 10. America 
experienced a wave of gun violence during the Prohibition Era. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Guns and 
Prohibition, in Al Capone’s Day and Now, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at A22. In response to this violence, 
Congress enacted the first federal firearms regulation in 1927, which in turn banned all mail-order 
handguns. Id. Just two years after D.C. Code section 22-4504 was passed, Congress enacted the 
National Firearms Act, a comprehensive law that regulated machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, pistols, 
and revolvers. National Firearms Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1236, ch. 757 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.); Act of July 8, 1932, 47 Stat. 651, ch. 465, § 4 (codified as amended at D.C. Code 
§ 22-4504 (2012)).
19. At that time, D.C. legislation still had to be passed by Congress. In 1973, Congress delegated to the 
District certain specific legislative powers. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental 
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). Although the law created an elected 
legislature for the District, Congress still had the ability to exercise final approval over the District’s 
annual budget and retained the power to prevent local legislation from going into effect. Id. §§ 401, 
602(c) (codified as amended at D.C. Code §§ 1-204.01, 1-206.02). See generally Philip G. Schrag, The 
Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 311, 312–13 (1990).
20. Act of July 8, 1932 § 4. The statute prohibited the carrying of a concealed pistol, and defined pistol as 
“any firearm with a barrel less than twelve inches in length.” Id. 
21. Stephen P. Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 
Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 105, 112 (1995). 
22. Id. at 113.
23. 23 D.C. Reg. 2464 (July 23, 1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 D.C. Code).
24. Edward D. Jones, III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975”: The Toughest 
Handgun Control Law in the United States—Or Is It?, 455 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 138, 
139 (1981).
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effectively banned the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of handguns in D.C.25 
The law required that gun owners re-register their firearms within sixty days of the 
enactment, after which handguns would be un-registerable.26 Additionally, the law 
granted the Police Chief the authority to issue licenses for rif les and shotguns.27
 The law was amended in 1992 to grant more discretion to the Police Chief for 
the issuance of licenses, particularly for applications from retired police officers.28 
The law survived several challenges29 until 2008, when the Supreme Court struck 
down the law as an unconstitutional ban on operable handguns in Heller.30 In 
response to the Court’s decision in Heller, the D.C. Council amended the law by 
enacting the Firearms Registration Emergency Amendment Act of 2008 (FREAA).31 
This amended version of the law provided that prohibitions on the registering of 
handguns shall not apply to “[a]ny person who seeks to register a pistol for use in self-
defense within that person’s home.”32 However, D.C. Code section 22-4504, the law 
banning the carrying of handguns, remained in effect.
 On August 6, 2009, just one year after Heller, several plaintiffs filed suit against 
the District of Columbia and Police Chief Cathy Lanier,33 in Palmer v. District of 
Columbia.34 Plaintiff Tom G. Palmer, a D.C. resident, sought to register his 
handgun.35 His application was denied by Lanier, on the grounds that his stated 
purpose, to carry his firearm loaded and in public for self-defense, was unacceptable 
under the FREAA.36 Plaintiff George Lyon, a D.C. resident, sought to register his 
firearm to be carried in public, and applied to register the firearm.37 Although Lyon 
25. Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, § 201(a) (codified as amended at D.C. Code § 7-2502.01). 
The law provided an exception for law enforcement officers and members of the military. Id. § 201(b)(1).
26. Jones, supra note 24, at 139. 
27. Id. 
28. Handgun Possession Amendment Act of 1992, § 2(b), 39 D.C. Reg. 5676 (May 7, 1993) (codified as 
amended at D.C. Code § 7-2502.01). The amendment provided discretion to the Police Chief regarding 
licenses for retired police officers. The amendment stated that the registration certificate expires at the 
time the retired police officer ceases to be a resident of D.C., and the Police Chief was not mandated to 
provide licenses if the person is a retired police officer. The amendment required the Police Chief to list, 
in writing, the reasons for the denial. Id.
29. See, e.g., Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 864–65 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the law was a valid police 
power of the D.C. Council); McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 757–58 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding 
that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that the Council had the power to enact such law).
30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–36 (2008).
31. 56 D.C. Reg. 1365 (Mar. 31, 2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 D.C. Code).
32. Id. § 3(c)(1)(B) (codified as amended at D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4)(C)). 
33. Complaint at 1–3, Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-cv-01482 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2009), 59 F. Supp. 
3d 173 [hereinafter Complaint].
34. See 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id. at 176–77.
37. Id. at 177.
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held licenses to carry handguns in the states of Virginia, Utah, and Florida, and had 
undergone approximately 240 hours of firearms training with at least 140 hours 
devoted to handguns, Lanier denied his application because his stated purpose, to 
keep a firearm in the home or office for protection, was unacceptable under the 
FREAA.38 Two other plaintiffs, Edward Raymond and Amy McVey, both non-
residents of D.C., were also denied licenses to carry firearms in public for the same 
reason.39 The final plaintiff in this action, the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. 
(SAF), has over 650,000 members and supporters nationwide, and became involved 
in the action because the issues raised were of great interest to the SAF’s constituency.40 
 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the D.C. statutes infringed on their Second 
Amendment rights to keep and bear arms, because the laws required a license to 
carry handguns without providing any licensing mechanism.41 The plaintiffs further 
argued that the statutes were functionally no different from those that were struck 
down in Heller in that it was a complete prohibition on the right to keep and bear 
arms.42 The defendants argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller did not 
guarantee a fundamental right to keep and bear arms and that the statutes should be 
analyzed under a reasonableness standard because they did not infringe upon the 
core right recognized in Heller.43 After extensive motion practice, the court granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on July 24, 2014.44
 In its decision, the court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to 
carry firearms outside the home for the purpose of self-defense and that the law 
forbidding the carrying of handguns outside the home infringed upon that right.45 In 
granting summary judgment, the court erred by misinterpreting the reasoning in 
Heller, by relying on the Seventh Circuit’s faulty reasoning in Moore v. Madigan, and 
by failing to conduct a scrutiny analysis to determine whether the challenged statutes 
passed constitutional muster.
 In Heller, the Supreme Court held that any law that acts as a total prohibition on 
the use and possession of handguns inside the home would fail to pass constitutional 
muster under any level of scrutiny.46 In Heller, the appellee, Richard Heller, was a 
38. Id. However, his application to register the handgun for self-protection in the home was subsequently 
approved. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See generally Godwin, supra note 14, at 527–28 (providing background on the SAF).
41. Complaint, supra note 33, at 8.
42. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, 
No. 1:09-cv-1482, Palmer v. District of Columbia (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009), 59 F. Supp. 3d 173. 
43. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 10–11, No. 1:09-cv-1482, Palmer v. 
District of Columbia (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2009), 59 F. Supp. 3d 173.
44. Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 184.
45. Id. at 182–83.
46. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
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D.C. special police officer47 authorized to carry a handgun while on duty.48 Heller 
applied for a registration certificate so that he could lawfully possess a handgun 
inside his home.49 However, at the time of his application, D.C. Code section 
7-2502.01 required that residents obtain a registration certificate to possess a firearm, 
and D.C. Code section 7-2502.02 banned the registration of handguns.50 
Furthermore, D.C. Code section 7-2507.02 required that all firearms within the 
home be “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.”51 
Heller’s application for a license was denied by the Police Chief.52
 Heller then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.53 The District Court dismissed Heller’s complaint, but the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, D.C. Circuit later reversed on the grounds that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on 
handguns and its trigger lock requirement violated that right.54 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to hear the case.55
 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, analyzed both the prefatory and 
operative clauses56 to conclude that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to 
possess firearms for self-defense in case of confrontation.57 Specifically, the Court 
stated that “the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 
Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the 
home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”58 The Court stressed that 
the District’s ban on handgun possession inside the home created a prohibition on 
weapons that a significant number of Americans regularly use and possess for the 
47. Heller was assigned to the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary Building. Id. at 575.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 574–75.
51. Id. at 575. D.C. residents who wished to carry a handgun could apply for a license from the Police Chief 
under D.C. Code section 22-4506. Id.
52. Id. 
53. Heller alleged that his Second Amendment rights were infringed upon and sought to enjoin the city 
from enforcing the ban on handgun registration, the license requirement, and the trigger lock 
requirement. Id. at 575–76.
54. Id. at 576.
55. District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1035 (2007).
56. The prefatory clause of the Second Amendment reads, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II). The prefatory clause 
is the lead-in to the operative clause and essentially provides the purpose for the operative clause. Id. at 
577. The operative clause of the Second Amendment reads, “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms shall not be infringed.” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II). The operative clause serves as the 
working component of the Second Amendment. Id.
57. Id. at 628 (“As the quotations earlier in this opinion demonstrate, the inherent right of self-defense has 
been central to the Second Amendment right.”).
58. Id. at 635.
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purpose of self-defense in the home.59 To reach its decision, the Court conducted a 
historical analysis to determine the meaning of the operative and prefatory clauses of 
the Second Amendment.60
 In Palmer, the court erred by misinterpreting the reasoning of Heller to extend 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home.61 The 
court opened its discussion section with the following statement: “The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago direct 
the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims.”62 However, in Heller, the laws being 
challenged prohibited the use and possession of operable handguns within the home 
and required that all legally owned firearms inside the home be rendered inoperable 
by trigger locks.63 Accordingly, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, D.C. 
residents were forbidden from owning and operating any handguns within the home 
for self-defense. The Supreme Court in Heller emphasized that the D.C. laws 
prohibited not only the public carrying of handguns, but also ownership within the 
home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”64 The 
Court outlined the benefits of the use of handguns in the home as opposed to rif les, 
specifically that residents may prefer handguns because of their size, the ability to 
keep them hidden and locked away, and the amount of pressure applied to the body 
when fired.65 The Court acknowledged the city’s interest in enacting legislation to 
combat gun violence and stressed that the Court’s decision still permitted the city to 
pass gun control regulations.66 However, the Court noted that its decision could 
potentially preclude certain gun regulations, namely, the absolute prohibition of 
firearms to be used in the home for self-defense.67
 In Palmer, the court misinterpreted the holding of Heller in concluding that the 
right to possess firearms extends outside the home,68 basing its analysis on Scalia’s 
59. Id. at 628–29.
60. Id. at 592. The Court cited various sources from the eighteenth century through the twenty-first 
century, including but not limited to states’ constitutions, statutes, court decisions, and treatises. Id. at 
592–603.
61. Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 178–83 (D.D.C. 2014).
62. Id. at 178. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court applied its decision in Heller to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully 
applicable to the states. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
63. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–76.
64. Id. at 628.
65. Id. at 629.
66. Id. at 636.
67. Id. (“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. 
These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”).
68. See Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 181 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]hese passages alone, 
though short of dispositive, strongly suggest that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a 
firearm in some fashion outside the home.” (quoting Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 
1153 (9th Cir. 2014))).
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review of history in Heller.69 However, this methodology was problematic, in that 
Scalia gave certain sources greater weight than others and did not consider all 
relevant sources.70 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, several historical 
sources have been proffered by legal scholars to demonstrate that throughout this 
country’s history, states have traditionally regulated the right to bear arms outside 
the home.71 The historical analysis in Heller was further called into question in the 
dissenting opinion of Peruta v. County of San Diego, where Judge Sidney Runyan 
Thomas analyzed the historical sources cited in Heller and interpreted these sources 
as supporting the claim that throughout our nation’s history, states have traditionally 
regulated the use and possession of firearms in public.72 Instead of relying on the 
historical analysis in Heller, the court in Palmer should have conducted its own 
historical analysis, reviewing not only the sources discussed by the Supreme Court in 
Heller, but also some of the additional sources that have since been offered to show 
that laws regulating the use and possession of firearms outside the home have 
traditionally been imposed and enforced by the states. By utilizing a wider range of 
historical sources, the court in Palmer would have been able to issue a more holistic 
and comprehensive opinion.73
 The core holding of Heller is that the Second Amendment guarantees the right 
to possess firearms within the home, and that laws that prohibit the total possession 
of guns in the home are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court never explicitly stated 
that the right extends outside the home or that states are forbidden from issuing 
regulations on the possession of firearms outside the home. The court in Palmer 
construed the self-defense component of the holding in Heller as applying to a 
reasonable prohibition on the carrying of firearms in public in Washington, D.C. 
However, the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense was not 
implicated, as residents were not prohibited from keeping and bearing arms within 
their homes for the purpose of self-defense.
69. Id. at 179–82.
70. Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Peruta, the Home-Bound Second Amendment, and Fractal Originalism, 127 Harv. 
L. Rev. F. 238, 239–40 (2014) (“With a nod toward George Orwell, the [Peruta] majority candidly 
judged that while all historical cases are ‘equally relevant’ to determine meaning, ‘some cases are more 
equal than others.’” (quoting Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155)). 
71. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1278, 1323–50 (2009); Nicholas Moeller, The Second Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: Concealed 
Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1401, 1407–09 (2014). 
72. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1182–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. See generally Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus 
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 38–39 (2012) (explaining how the oft-analyzed 
Statute of Northampton provided guidance to two states in the nineteenth century to permit regulations 
on firearms and other dangerous weapons in the public sphere); Paul Finkelman, The Living Constitution 
and the Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and a Very Confused Court, 37 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 623, 642–48 (2015) (providing a more thorough description of several sources proffered by Justice 
Scalia in Heller, namely, provisions of the eighteenth century Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, 
and Virginia state constitutions).
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 In Moore v. Madigan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
considered a challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibited citizens from carrying a 
gun in public, either open or concealed.74 The Seventh Circuit overturned the statute, 
holding that it violated the Second Amendment right to carry firearms outside the 
home.75 In overturning the statute, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, 
stated that Heller provides “that ‘the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute in the home’ but that doesn’t mean it is not acute outside the home.”76 In 
Moore, the court used select excerpts from the historical analysis undertaken by 
Justice Scalia in Heller.77 The court stated that the terms “to keep” and “to bear” are 
distinct from each other and would have been understood to apply outside of the 
home in the eighteenth century, when settlers lived in the western boundaries of the 
United States.78 The court continued its historical analysis by analyzing old English 
terms and legal scholars’ historical interpretations of the right to bear arms.79 The 
court acknowledged that its historical analysis was inconclusive, because additional 
sources of historical evidence could be proffered to arrive at a different conclusion.80 
The court in Moore therefore based its opinion on a historical analysis after effectively 
conceding that this analysis was insufficient.
 The court further focused on Heller’s use of the term “confrontation” in defining 
the scope of the Second Amendment.81 Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation.”82 The court in Moore, pointing to this language in 
Heller, claimed that the Supreme Court’s decision invokes a broader right than to 
simply possess firearms in one’s home.83 While noting that, both as a theory and 
empirically, the relationship between crime rates and public carry is uncertain, the 
court added to Heller’s broad invocation, stating “that knowing that many law-
abiding citizens are walking the streets armed may make criminals timid.”84
74. 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). The law provided exceptions for police and security personnel, as 
well as hunters. The law also contained exceptions for people to carry guns on their own property, either 
owned or rented, and in their places of business. Additionally, the law provided an exception permitting 
people to carry guns on the property belonging to someone who allowed them to do so. Id.
75. Id. at 942.
76. Id. at 935 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
77. Id. at 936–37.
78. Id. at 936.
79. Id. at 936–37.
80. Id. at 937 (“All this is debatable of course, but we are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis 
because it was central to the Court’s holding in Heller.”).
81. Id. at 935–36.
82. Id. at 936 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)).
83. Id. at 935–36 (“[T]he amendment ‘guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case 
of confrontation.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592)). 
84. Id. at 937.
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 In Heller, however, the Supreme Court held that citizens have the right to keep 
and bear arms “in defense of hearth and home.”85 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, 
acknowledging that gun violence is a national problem, made clear that states and 
municipalities are permitted to enact regulations targeting gun violence, so long as 
those regulations do not prohibit the possession of handguns to be used in defense of 
the home.86
 Even though the Supreme Court limited its discussion of the Second Amendment 
to the home, the court in Moore expanded the Heller decision beyond that of any other 
lower court to date. The court in Moore essentially culled passages from the language 
in Heller favorable to its conclusion, and then declared that this selected language 
created a right to bear arms outside the home under the Second Amendment. Lastly, 
the court ignored the basis for the cause of action in Heller, which was an outright ban 
on operable handguns inside the home. The Supreme Court in Heller limited its 
decision to laws banning the possession of firearms inside the home, and the court in 
Moore took a bold step in declaring that this right extends outside the home.
 In Palmer, the court erred by relying on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Moore 
to conclude that the Second Amendment extends outside the home.87 Specifically, the 
court applied Judge Posner’s self-defense argument extracted from the Heller decision, 
namely that situations requiring a handgun for self-defense are not limited to inside 
the home.88 Like the court in Moore, the court in Palmer extracted favorable language 
from Heller, even when the Heller decision confined the right to inside the home, and 
even when the statute at issue in Heller involved a ban on handguns inside the home. 
The court in Palmer concluded that the challenged statutes amounted to “blanket 
prohibitions” on the right to bear arms for self-defense, thus equating the challenged 
laws with the “blanket prohibitions” articulated in Moore.89 However, the challenged 
laws in Palmer were not blanket prohibitions, as citizens were still able to possess 
handguns within their homes. Moreover, the court in Moore was the first circuit court 
post-Heller to label a challenged firearm law regulating the possession of firearms 
outside the home as a “blanket prohibition,” and in doing so, it expanded the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heller, creating a dangerous precedent whereby any laws regulating 
the possession and use of firearms outside the home can be struck down.
 In Palmer, the court erred by not conducting a scrutiny analysis to determine the 
constitutionality of the challenged statutes. There are three ascending levels of 
scrutiny: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.90 Under 
85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
86. Id. at 636.
87. See Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 182 (D.D.C. 2014).
88. Id. at 180.
89. Id. at 182 (“A blanket prohibition on carrying gun[s] in public prevents a person from defending himself 
anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of armed self-defense 
requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might  benefit on balance from 
such a curtailment, though there is no proof that it would.” (quoting Moore, 702 F.3d at 940)).
90. E.g., United States v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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rational basis review, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the 
government can show that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.91 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving 
that the legislation furthers an important state interest and that the means are 
substantially related to that important state interest.92 Strict scrutiny, the highest 
level of scrutiny and the level often applied in cases involving legislation impinging 
on fundamental rights,93 requires that the government prove the legislation is 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”94 Courts have applied these 
three levels of scrutiny to laws regulating various constitutional rights.95
 Courts have been provided little guidance regarding the applicable levels of 
scrutiny to challenges of laws regulating the possession and use of firearms outside 
the home. In Heller, the Court did not suggest the level of scrutiny to be applied in 
future cases involving Second Amendment challenges.96
 Since the Heller decision, several circuit courts have applied intermediate scrutiny 
to determine the constitutionality of legislation regulating the scope of the Second 
Amendment outside the home.97 One circuit court went so far as to apply a substantial 
burden standard, in that so long as the challenged statute did not substantially burden 
the Second Amendment right, no level of heightened scrutiny would be applied.98
91. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
92. E.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
93. E.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
94. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 
551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007)).
95. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, cable television system operators brought a First Amendment 
challenge against the must carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992. 512 U.S. 622, 622–23 (1994). The Supreme Court applied intermediate 
scrutiny upon determining that the regulations were content neutral. Id. at 662. In City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court heard a Fifth Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance 
that prohibited group homes for the mentally ill in the city of Cleburne. 473 U.S. 432, 436–38 (1985). 
The Court applied a rational basis test and invalidated the zoning ordinance. Id. at 448. For an application 
of strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court, see Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
96. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). The majority merely concluded that rational 
basis review should not apply to cases involving specific, enumerated rights. Id. at 628 n.27.
97. In United States v. Marzzarella, the Third Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a case involving the 
challenge of a federal law prohibiting the possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number. 614 
F.3d at 88. The court reasoned that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard because the 
burden imposed by the federal statute did not “severely limit the possession of firearms.” Id. at 97. 
Similarly, in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a 
challenge of New York’s handgun licensing scheme. 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). There, the 
challengers claimed that their Second Amendment rights were infringed when the state required them 
to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm in public. Id. at 83–84. 
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a challenge to the Maryland 
state licensing scheme, which required applicant to demonstrate a “good-and-substantial” reason to 
obtain a license to carry a concealed weapon. 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
98. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
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 In U.S. v. Marzzarella, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a challenged firearm regulation, finding that the 
burden imposed by the challenged statute did not “severely limit” the ability to 
possess firearms.99 The court upheld the challenged regulation, utilizing a two-
pronged test.100 The test first required an analysis as to whether the challenged 
regulations regulated conduct that falls within the scope of Second Amendment 
protection.101 If the regulation did not, then the inquiry would be complete.102 If it 
did, the court would then conduct an analysis under some level of means-end 
scrutiny.103
 Like Marzzarella, the Palmer court should have employed intermediate scrutiny 
in determining the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. Here, the challenged 
regulations merely prohibited the carrying of handguns in the public sphere and did 
not severely limit the ability to possess firearms for self-defense inside the home. 
However, if this court did conduct a scrutiny analysis, it could be shown that the 
challenged statutes would satisfy both intermediate and strict scrutiny. In order to 
withstand strict scrutiny, it would have to be shown that the statutes were “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”104 It is clear that there were compelling 
state interests in public safety and the prevention of crime in Palmer when the 
disputed regulations were passed.105 D.C. Code section 22-4504 was enacted in 1932 
to prevent people from carrying guns on their person within city limits.
 Then, prior to the enactment of D.C. Code section 7-2502, the city experienced 
a threefold increase in homicides from 1960 to 1969.106 Although the homicide rate 
99. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96.
100. Id. at 89, 99.
101. Id. at 89.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 99 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007)).
105. See, e.g., Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (holding that public safety 
is a significant governmental interest); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (noting that 
the government has a compelling interest in preventing crime). In 1932, the entire nation, and 
particularly the District of Columbia, was concerned with an uptick in gun violence throughout the 
country. Gun violence in Washington, D.C. attracted nationwide attention when a senator was seriously 
wounded in a gun battle between police officers and bootleggers in downtown D.C. Alexander 
DeConde, Gun Violence in America: The Struggle for Control 133 (2001). Citizens across the 
country grew more concerned with an increase in gun violence and demanded action from the federal 
government. The issue of gun control even played a role in the 1932 presidential election between 
Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Id. at 134.
106. Paul Duggan,  Crime Data Underscore Limits of D.C. Gun Ban’s Effectiveness,  Wash. Post (Nov. 13, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/12/AR2007111201818.html.
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in D.C. has dropped considerably since this period,107 it remains high.108 In addition, 
the city’s dangerously close proximity to the epicenter of the U.S. government makes 
that interest even more compelling. It would be unwise and unsafe to forbid these 
reasonable gun restrictions in a city that houses the President, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court. Furthermore, gun violence is a problem that has plagued the city of 
Washington, D.C. for some time. These statutes were narrowly tailored to satisfy the 
compelling interests of public safety and preventing crime. As the majority of 
homicides in D.C. are committed with a firearm,109 these statutes merely seek to 
keep handguns off the streets of the District.
 The Palmer court misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. 
Furthermore, the court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Moore and 
misapplied that court’s reasoning, thereby extending the Second Amendment to 
include the right to carry weapons outside the home. Lastly, the court in Palmer 
should have conducted a scrutiny analysis, specifically an analysis under intermediate 
scrutiny. In deeming the challenged statutes unconstitutional, the court has not only 
extended the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller beyond its original scope, but has 
also set the stage for courts across the country to strike down reasonable gun 
restrictions. Additionally, permitting residents of D.C. to carry a handgun at all 
times in public is a serious security threat. Given the recent security breaches at the 
White House,110 it would be unwise to permit residents to carry handguns in public. 
On a wider scale, by declaring that common sense laws targeting the carrying of 
handguns in public may be struck down under the guise of self-defense, this decision 
will establish a dangerous precedent, making it increasingly difficult for states and 
localities to enact common-sense firearms regulations.
107. Allison Klein, Homicides Decrease in Washington Region, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/homicide-rate-decreases-in-washington-region/2012/12/31/0d626dec-
4d3c-11e2-950a-7863a013264b_story.html.
108. In 2014, there were 105 homicides committed in the District of Columbia. Washington, D.C. Metro. 
Police Dep’t, Annual Report 2014, at 22 (2014), http://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/
mpdc/publication/attachments/MPD%20Annual%20Report%202014_lowres_0.pdf. That total 
represented a rate of sixteen homicides per 100,000 residents. In 2010, there were 132 homicides in the 
District of Columbia, and that total represented a rate of twenty-two homicides per 100,000 residents. 
Id. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics, the national rate of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter for 2010 was 4.8 per 100,000 citizens. Crime in the United States by Volume and 
Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1991–2010, Fed. Bureau Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
109. In 2014, seventy-two out of the 105 homicides in the District of Columbia were committed with a 
firearm. Washington, D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, supra note 108, at 23.
110. On September 19, 2014, Omar Gonzalez jumped over the black iron fence surrounding the White 
House and entered through the main entrance, just minutes after the President and his family had left 
the White House. He was tackled right away, and Secret Service officers found a knife in his possession. 
This breach followed another incident that occurred on September 11, 2014, when a man was 
apprehended after jumping the fence. Michael D. Shear & Steve Kenny, Review Ordered of White House 
Security, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2014, at A20. These incidents led to the resignation of the Director of 
the Secret Service. Then on October 22, 2014, a man was apprehended after jumping over the fence 
onto the North Lawn of the White House. Michael S. Schmidt, Fence Jumper Caught at White House, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2014, at A19.
